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Recent Developments
Lussier v. Maryland Racing Commission

I

n November, 1996, the
Court of Appeals of
Maryland confronted the issue of
an
administrative
agency's
legislative authority to impose
sanctions for violations of agency
regulations in Lussier v. Maryland
Racing Commission, 343 Md. 681,
684 A.2d 804 (1996). Following a
long history of prior cases
expanding administrative· agencies' powers to include the
imposition of sanctions, the court
of appeals upheld the agency's
legislatively-vested authority to
impose a penalty on individuals
who violate that agency's rules,
regardless of whether an express
statutory authority for the penalty
exists. Thus, the court of appeals
reaffirmed its position that
administrative officials should be
given broad discretion in creating
and enforcing regulations.
In 1991, Frank P. Lussier
("Lussier"), a Vermont resident,
purchased three thoroughbred
racehorses. Lussier subsequently
hired
Michael
Downing
("Downing"), a New England
horse trainer, to train and maintain
the horses.
Downing entered
Lussier's horses in three separate
$12,000 claiming races at
Maryland's Laurel Race Course.
Prior to each race, Lussier
appeared to sell or transfer the
horse that was scheduled to run in
the race to another owner. Lussier
bet heavily on each horse. In all
three races, Lussier won. After
winning, Lussier repurchased the
horse or transferred the horse back
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to his trainer. Actual sales of the
horses, however, were never consummated.
Finding that the Daily Racing
Form had published the names of
the new owner or trainer of the
horse and false workout times for
each horse prior to each race, the
Maryland Racing Commission
("Commission")
and
the
Thoroughbred Racing Protective
Bureau initiated an investigation of
Lussier and Downing in February,
1992. Following a hearing, the
Commission decided that Lussier
had acted improperly under the
racing rules set forth in the Code
of Maryland Regulations and
therefore was subject to a fine of
$5,000. Lussier appealed to the
Circuit Court for Baltimore
County for judicial review of the
Commission's order. The circuit
court upheld the Commission's
imposition of the fine. Lussier
then appealed to the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland,
which affirmed the lower court's
decision. Next, Lussier petitioned
for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals of Maryland, and was
granted certiorari as to the question

of whether the Commission
possessed the authority to impose
a fine for a violation of its
regulations absent an express
statutory provision granting the
power to so fine.
Maryland courts have consistently upheld broad interpretations of administrative agencies' powers under their enabling
statutes. Lussier v. Maryland
Racing Comm 'n, 343 Md. at
695-96, 684 A.2d at 811. The
Lussier court followed precedent
by holding that the Commission
may impose penalties (i.e. monetary fines) on individuals who
violated
the
Commission's
regulations despite the absence of
any express statutory authority to
impose such penalties. In making
this decision, the court of appeals
agreed with the court of special
appeals' analysis of the Commission's legislatively conferred
powers. Id. at 699, 684 A.2d at
813.
Relying on Chapter 273 of the
Acts of 1920, the court of appeals
established its basis for declaring
the Commission's regulation
imposing a reasonable fine valid.
Id. at 691-92, 684 A.2d at 809.
Although this statute does not
specifically grant the Commission
power to impose fines, the court
maintained that an agency's ability
to act in a particular manner is
determined by the statutes, legislative history, and policies applicable to the agency. Id. at 686,
684 A.2d at 806. The Legislature
need not specifically authorize the
27.1 U. Bait. L.F. 71
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agency's powers. Id. at 686-87,
684 A.2d at 807.
According to the court, the
complexities of modem life preclude government officials from
becoming experts in all areas. Id.
at 702, 684 A.2d at 814. Agencies
must be created to assist government in acquiring knowledge and
understanding
of
these
complexities. Id. When establishing these agencies, the Legislature
often employs broad language in
the enabling statute due to the void
in the Legislature's expertise. Id.
This lack of specificity is intended
by the Legislature to facilitate the
administration of laws. Id. (citing
Sullivan v. Board of License
Comm'rs, 293 Md. 113, 121,442
A.2d 558, 563 (1982)). Thus, the
explicit language of the statute
does not completely constrain the
agency's actions. Id. at 686-87,
684 A.2d at 806-07 (citing Comptroller of the Treasury v.
Washington Restaurant Group,
Inc., 339 Md. 667, 670-73, 664
A.2d 899, 901-02 (1995); Holy
Cross Hospital v. Health Services
Cost Review Comm 'n, 283 Md.
677, 686, 393 A.2d 181, 185
(1978)).
The court of appeals has
repeatedly held agency regulations
valid as long as the regulations did
not contradict the language and
intention of the agency's enabling
statute. Id. at 687-88, 684 A.2d at
806-07. Furthermore, the court of
appeals accorded the administrative interpretation of the statute
and the legislative response to
agency enactments great weight.

27.1 U. BaIt. L.F. 72

Id. at 688,684 A.2d at 807.
As the court of appeals held
that the imposition of a fine is consistent with the legislative intent
underlying the statute and the
Commission's statutory authority,
the Commission may create
punitive regulations to enforce its
regulations. Id. at 689-90, 684
A.2d at 808. This power falls into
the discretionary void left by the
Legislature in the statute. Id. at
691-92, 684 A.2d at 809. The
Legislature did not intend the
statute to limit the Commission's
power and preclude the agency
from enforcing its regulations. Id.
at 699-700, 684 A.2d at 813.
In his dissenting opinion,
Judge Bell challenged the
majority'S broad interpretation of
the statute by arguing that the
broad discretion accorded to the
administrative agency is a violation of the separation of powers
doctrine. Id. at 707-09, 684 A.2d
at 817. Judge Bell reasoned that
agency authority must be limited
to those powers expressly granted
in the statute. Id. Thus, statutory
authority with proper safeguards
must exist for an agency to impose
fines. /d. at 708-709, 684 A.2d at
817.
An alternative approach,
alluded to in Judge Bell's dissent
in delegating authority to an
agency, is the use of legislative
oversight and judicial review prior
to an agency's enactment of a
punitive regulation. Id. The
majority supported an uncomplicated delegation of authority to
the agency.

Administrative agencies are
created to administer laws, not to
make laws. Id. at 708-09, 684
A.2d at 817-18. The creation and
enactment of laws should be
undertaken by the public's elected
officials, not by the elected
officials'
administrative
appointees. Id. Although the courts
and the Legislature must afford
some deference to the experts in
these agencies, the Legislature
cannot allow these agencies to
usurp the Legislature's authority to
promulgate public policy and law.
Id. at 689, 684 A.2d at 808 (citing
Fogle v. H & G Restaurant, Inc.,
337 Md. 441, 455, 654 A.2d 449,
456 (1995)).
As a result of the court of
appeals' decision in Lussier to
interpret administrative agencies'
enabling statutes broadly, the court
has empowered the agencies to
assert greater control over their
areas of expertise. By allowing
administrative agencies to attach
penalties to their regulations, the
agencies have evolved from
executive branch departments to
miniature
legislatures
and
judiciaries. The agencies will
undoubtedly become more intrusive in the lives of the citizens of
Maryland.
The citizens of
Maryland would receive greater
benefits from broad statutory
interpretation of agency authority,
however, if such administrative
power is coupled with legislative
oversight and judicial review of
the enactment of punitive agency
regulations.

